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SYMPOSIUM

REWRITING JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND THE FEMINIST
SCHOLARLY PROJECT
Linda L. Berger, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Bridget J. Crawford*
In 1995, the authors of a law review article examining “feminist judging”
focused on the existing social science data concerning women judges and compared
the voting records and opinions of the only female Justices on the U.S. Supreme
1
Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day O’Connor. Based on this review, the
authors concluded that appointing more women as judges would make little
2
difference to judicial outcomes or processes. The authors accused those who
3
advocated for more women on the bench of having a hidden feminist agenda and
bluntly concluded that “[b]y any measure, feminist judges fit very uneasily in most
4
conceptions of the proper role of the judicial system.”
More than twenty years later, scholars have a better understanding of what
constitutes “feminist judging”; moving beyond the gender of those involved in

© 2018 Linda L. Berger, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Bridget J. Crawford. Individuals and
nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Symposium in any format, at or
below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation
to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Linda Berger is the Family Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. Kathryn Stanchi is the Jack E. Feinberg ’57 Professor of
Litigation and an Affiliated Professor of Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies at Temple
University Beasley School of Law. Bridget Crawford is a Professor of Law at the Elisabeth Haub
School of Law at Pace University.
1 Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891,
919 (1995) (“The weight of the evidence demonstrates that most female judges do not decide cases
in a distinctively feminist or feminine manner.”); cf. Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Feminist Judging: An
Introductory Essay, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 609, 610 n.2 (1993) (explaining that the
concept of “feminist judging” is not confined to women judges but “focuses more on the idea that
we should move away from traditional legal decisionmaking (which generally promotes white male
hegemony) and begin to reconstruct our legal system to consider the views of women, people of
color, gays and lesbians, and other subordinated groups”).
2 See Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 1, at 899.
3 Id. at 892 n.8 (“It is precisely the call for feminist judging, which we think fairly
characterizes much of the literature advocating more female judges, that bears the brunt of most of
our criticism. Nonetheless, our primary concern is with the call for more female judges, regardless
of whether they purport to have a ‘feminist’ agenda.”).
4 Id. at 893.
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making judgments, feminist judging is understood to derive from the asking of
feminist questions and the application of feminist theories and methods. Current
scholars also are taking a closer look at the role of feminist judicial perspectives
throughout the judicial system. Through a series of “feminist judgments” projects
5
around the globe, scholars are testing the proposition that feminist judging “fits”
within the judicial role, no matter the gender of the judge. In the form of rewritten
opinions based on the facts and precedent in effect at the time of the original
decision, these projects demonstrate that judges who apply feminist perspectives
would make a profound difference, not only in the outcomes and processes in
6
individual cases, but also in the development of the law.
In these projects, feminist judging is recognized as a complex and potentially
transformative practice. Thus, as Kathryn Abrams suggested in 1991 about feminist
7
lawyering, the effects of feminist judging could be extensive and far reaching.
Because legal methods are not set in stone but instead consist of “a partly cohering
collection of professional practices and argumentative conventions employed by
those who make their livings as lawyers,” feminist advocates might over time
“transform not only lawyers’ views of gender justice, but their views of how to use
8
law to persuade and produce social change.” As Rosemary Hunter wrote more
recently, such a transformation is possible because feminist judging has both
substantive and procedural goals: “It aims to achieve gender justice in the outcomes
of cases as well as in the process of judging, and to consider the effects of decisions
9
on broader social relationships.”
Beyond the general agreement that feminist judging is not confined to
decisionmaking by women judges, feminist judging remains difficult to categorize.
Unlike other jurisprudential approaches, feminism is “a wider social theory and

5 See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (Heather
Douglas et al., eds., 2014); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter
et al., eds., 2010); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND: TE RINO: A TWOSTRANDED ROPE (Elisabeth McDonald et al., eds., 2017); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN
OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger &
Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST JUDGMENTS]; NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright et
al., eds., 2017); Diana Majury, Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CANADIAN J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2006); Sharon Cowan, Chloë Kennedy & Vanessa Munro, Scottish Feminist
Judgments Project, U. EDINBURGH: EDINBURGH L. SCH., http://www.sfjp.law.ed.ac.uk/ (last
visited Sept. 6, 2018); Feminist International Judgments Project: Women’s Voices in International
Law, U. LEICESTER, http://www2.le.ac.uk/institution/researchimages/feminist-internationaljudgments-project-women2019s-voices-in-international-law (last visited Sept. 6, 2018); Jhuma
Sen et al., The Feminist Judgments Project: India, FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT INDIA,
https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi/call-for-papers (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).
6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7 See Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
373, 400 (1991).
8 Id. at 375.
9 Rosemary Hunter et al., Judging in Lower Courts: Conventional, Procedural, Therapeutic
and Feminist Approaches, 12 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 337, 347 (2016).
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political practice which seeks to explain the causes of and to remedy women’s
10
disadvantages, inequalities and subordination.”
Moreover, “feminism” itself comprises a multiplicity of theories, methods, and
11
approaches. Nonetheless, the organizers of feminist judgments projects agree that
feminist judgments have some things in common. These include an awareness of
the ways in which apparently neutral or objective legal rules and practices have
12
varying, and nonneutral, effects on individuals.
They also include identifying
whose perspectives are missing from current laws and “incorporating, where
relevant, the experiences, perspectives and interests of women and other
13
traditionally excluded groups into decisionmaking.”
Since the 2016 publication of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the
14
United States Supreme Court, much has happened in the United States to make us
both more and less optimistic about the future incorporation of feminist perspectives
into judicial opinions. Systemic barriers to gender justice are being built while
others are apparently giving way. For example, even though appointing more
women judges does not guarantee more feminist judgments, the trend of
appointments to the federal courts threatens to stall a slow transformation of the
15
federal judiciary into a more diverse body. After decades of growth in the number
of newly appointed judges who were women and members of other underrepresented
groups, President Donald Trump was, as of November 2017, “nominating white men
16
to America’s federal courts at a rate not seen in nearly 30 years.”
Similarly, using words and phrases typically associated with “feminism,” such
as “patriarchy” or “sex-role stereotyping,” does not guarantee that feminist
perspectives will be incorporated into judicial decisionmaking. Yet its absence is
10 Id. at 346.
11 Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Linda L. Berger, Feminist Judging Matters:
How Feminist Theory and Methods Affect the Process of Judgment, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 167, 167–
68 (2018).
12 Hunter, Anleu & Mack, supra note 9, at 347; see also Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger
& Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 3–5 [hereinafter Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project].
13 Hunter et al., supra note 9, at 347 (“The role of a feminist judge is therefore to achieve
justice by . . . acknowledging and incorporating, where relevant, the experiences, perspectives and
interests of women and other traditionally excluded groups into decision-making.”); see also
Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, supra note 12, at 3 (describing feminism as
“a movement and mode of inquiry that has grown to endorse justice for all people, particularly
those historically oppressed or marginalized by or through law”).
14 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5.
15 See, e.g., Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Trump’s Judicial Nominations Would
Put a Lot of White Men on Federal Courts, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/28/this-is-how-trump-ischanging-the-federal-courts/?utm_term=.4fe9ec061811.
16 Catherine Lucey & Meghan Hoyer, Trump Choosing White Men as Judges, Highest Rate
in
Decades,
AP
NEWS
(Nov.
13,
2017),
https://apnews.com/a2c7a89828c747ed9439f60e4a89193e/Trump-choosing-white-men-asjudges,-highest-rate-in-decades. According to the Associated Press, “91 percent of Trump’s
nominees are white, and 81 percent are male . . . . Three of every four are white men, with few
African-Americans and Hispanics in the mix. The last president to nominate a similarly
homogenous group was George H.W. Bush.” Id.
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disheartening all the same. A recent study found that the words “feminist” and
“feminism” have been used only once in the content of a Supreme Court majority
opinion and that feminism has been discussed substantively only twice in any
17
Supreme Court opinion. At a time when feminist scholarship about the law has
proliferated, and feminist advocates have made feminist arguments in cases with
gender implications, the use of feminist vocabulary has declined in both briefs and
18
opinions in the federal appellate courts.
This omission of words or phrases
typically associated with feminism, let alone the actual words “feminist” or
“feminism,” suggests that “[feminist] words are not properly within the language of
19
law.” And this omission is significant because the language of law is a “prestigious
type of language that must be used if the speaker is to function effectively and to
20
which only the most powerful members of society have access.”
In the face of barriers in the courts, public movements may advance gender
21
justice. When the #MeToo movement began, experts pointed out how difficult it
22
is to prove sexual harassment in the courts. Sandra Sperino and Suja Thomas wrote
that over the last fifty years, the legal system has increasingly favored “employers
over employees via a host of procedural, evidentiary and substantive mechanisms.
Sexual harassment lawsuits are one area where this systematic bias appears; racial
23
discrimination lawsuits are another.”
The current public discussion may effectively instigate change that the law has
been unable to achieve. As Catharine MacKinnon, the lawyer and legal scholar
largely responsible for the creation of sexual harassment as a cognizable legal
24
claim, recently wrote:

17 McKaye L. Neumeister, Note, By Any Other Name: The Vocabulary of “Feminism” at the
Supreme Court, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 241, 245–46 (2017).
18 Id. at 254 (“As of December 2016, 305 opinions from the federal Courts of Appeals use
the word ‘feminist(s)’ or ‘feminism(s).’ Focusing on a narrower period from 1970 through 2015,
the Courts of Appeals decided 1,917,930 total cases. This means that the words ‘feminist’ or
‘feminism’ appear in only 0.016% of Courts of Appeals decisions in that period.”).
19 Id. at 245.
20 Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to
the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 9 (1998).
21 An emphasis on culture as a fruitful locus for changing social values is a hallmark of what
some have called “third-wave feminism.” See Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist
Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
99, 162–63 (2007) (“Although third-wave feminists may appear to ignore the law, reject its methods
or reject its accomplishments, they are very much engaged in a transformative project. Through
writing, art, video, dance, and music, third-wave feminists communicate messages about the
importance of women and their experiences. This type of cultural work can, in some sense, be seen
as a necessary pre-condition to an evolution in the law . . . . [T]hird-wave engagement with culture
may be a precursor to the law’s adoption of some third-wave feminist ideas.”).
22 Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s Not (Legally)
Harassment,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html.
23 Id.; see also SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S
COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017).
24 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); see also Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women’s
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#MeToo, this uprising of the formerly disregarded, . . . has made untenable the
assumption that the one who reports sexual abuse is a lying slut, and that is
changing everything already. Sexual harassment law prepared the ground, but it
25
is today’s movement that is shifting gender hierarchy’s tectonic plates.

According to MacKinnon, the “unprecedented wave of speaking out in conventional
and social media . . . is eroding the two biggest barriers to ending sexual harassment
26
in law and in life: the disbelief and trivializing dehumanization of its victims.”
Thus, as MacKinnon explains, changes in the law had to come first in order to
make it possible to conceive of sexual violations in terms of inequality. Over time,
however, those changes were not enough. According to MacKinnon, because
“[p]owerful individuals and entities are [now] taking sexual abuse seriously . . . and
acting against it as never before . . . survivors are initiating consequences none of
27
them could have gotten through any lawsuit.” Even more significantly, if the
movement shifts society’s norms over the long term, those norms may eventually be
incorporated into the law.
In this context, we welcome the following nine reviews of and responses to
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, a
volume we edited that included twenty-five rewritten decisions and commentary on
each rewritten opinion. The book project involved over fifty contributors, including
28
legal scholars from all corners of the academy, as well as practicing attorneys. The
following reviews are from a wide array of authors from various disciplines; they
include law professors, a former judge, practicing attorneys, and a political scientist.
These diverse reviewers engage with the book from a number of varying
perspectives, with some focusing on doctrine, others on theory, and still others on
process. The end result is a rich and comprehensive look at the volume whose
alternative judgments might have resulted in transformative legal and cultural shifts
in the United States in terms of gender equality. Widening the scope of alternative
judgments, the volume of rewritten opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court has
inspired a series of subject-matter specific books that are forthcoming from
29
Cambridge University Press.
First among the following reviews is one that illustrates the importance of
incorporating feminist perspectives into judgments on women’s rights in the
workplace. Gillian Thomas, an attorney with the ACLU Women’s Rights Project,
touches on several of the volume’s rewritten feminist judgments, including Muller

Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 42–43 (1990) (describing Professor
MacKinnon’s development of the legal claim of sexual harassment).
25 Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5.
29 The first book in the series has been published. See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN
TAX OPINIONS (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017). There is approval in place
or concrete plans for volumes that focus on Reproductive Justice, Torts, Corporations, Trusts and
Estates, Employment Discrimination, and Family Law. See Series Projects, THE U.S. FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS PROJECT, https://sites.temple.edu/usfeministjudgments/projects/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2018).
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32

v. Oregon, Geduldig v. Aiello, and Dothard v. Rawlinson. Of each of these
feminist judgments, Thomas says that they offer “invaluable lessons to today’s
practitioners” about the importance of telling clients’ stories “to judges who
themselves may be years, even decades, away from ‘real’ jobs, and who have
33
remained isolated from the realities of working women’s lives.” Thomas explores
the ways in which the gendered nature of work is a “construct of assumptions,
34
stereotypes, and anachronistic traditions.”
Law professors Sandra Sperino and Elizabeth Kukura focus on the doctrinal
35
transformation in two critical feminist judgments: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
36
and Roe v. Wade.
Professor Sperino makes the case that Professor Martha
Chamallas’s rewrite of Price Waterhouse would have worked a sea change for future
37
Title VII jurisprudence. In particular, Sperino praises the rewritten opinion for
moving the law beyond the inflammatory comments made to and about Ann
Hopkins. While these comments—which included remarks that Hopkins should
have gone to “charm school” and should walk and talk more “femininely”—
undoubtedly helped Ann Hopkins as an individual plaintiff, they loomed so large in
the original Price Waterhouse decision that future plaintiffs had difficulty proving
38
discrimination in the absence of similarly outrageous comments.
Sperino points out that Chamallas’s rewrite emphasizes not the specific
comments per se, but the structural discrimination at Price Waterhouse—an
embedded and systematic misogyny of which the comments were merely a
39
symptom.
This doctrinal shift would have encouraged lower courts to look
underneath the surface of discriminatory workplace behavior to discover what
structures put in place by the employer enabled and encouraged the behavior.
Sperino also praises the feminist judgment for its rejection of the judge-made
40
dichotomy between disparate impact and disparate treatment cases. In Sperino’s
view, Title VII does not distinguish these two kinds of cases and thus Chamallas’s
opinion is truer to the statutory text.

30 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Rewritten Opinion in Muller v. Oregon, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS,
supra note 5, at 83, 83–97.
31 Lucinda M. Finley, Rewritten Opinion in Geduldig v. Aiello, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS,
supra note 5, at 190, 190–207.
32 Maria L. Ontiveros, Rewritten Opinion in Dothard v. Rawlinson, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 213, 213–27.
33 Gillian Thomas, Feminist Judgments and Women’s Rights at Work, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. ONLINE 12, 12 (2018).
34 Id. at 16.
35 Martha Chamallas, Rewritten Opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 345, 345–60.
36 Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Rewritten Opinion in Roe v. Wade, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS,
supra note 5, at 151, 151–67.
37 Sandra Sperino, Feminist Judgments and the Rewritten Price Waterhouse, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 17, 17–19 (2018).
38 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
39 Sperino, supra note 37, at 17–18.
40 Id. at 18.
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Law professor Elizabeth Kukura takes a similarly future-looking approach to
41
her evaluation of Kimberly Mutcherson’s Roe v. Wade. Kukura emphasizes the
critical importance of Mutcherson’s rejection of “viability” as the point at which the
state’s interest in the life of the fetus becomes compelling. She also commends
Mutcherson for grounding women’s reproductive rights in the Equal Protection
42
Clause as well as privacy. For Kukura, what many see as a mere academic debate
has serious, real-world consequences, not just for women who wish to obtain an
abortion, but also acutely for women who wish to give birth on their own terms.
Kukura focuses on cases referred to as “obstetric violence,” in which pregnant
women who wish to control the means of giving birth are coerced, and sometimes
physically forced, to undergo procedures against their will. She tells the story of a
woman who wished to have a vaginal birth for her second child after delivering her
first child by cesarean section. The woman was literally forced down by medical
43
personnel and made to endure a cesarean section. For this woman, and all women
who wish to make free choices about reproduction, the doctrinal basis for Roe is not
solely an academic question.
In her review essay, law professor Noa Ben-Asher notes a doctrinal move that
Angela Onwuachi-Willig makes in her feminist rewrite of Meritor Savings Bank v.
44
Vinson, but Ben-Asher’s primary focus is on the theoretical. Specifically, she
observes that Onwuachi-Willig’s Meritor would have moved discrimination
jurisprudence away from the liberal feminism that has dominated the discourse since
45
the 1970s toward an antisubordination theory.
Again, this shift in OnwuachiWillig’s rewrite is theoretical, but the practical consequences are undeniable. In
Onwuachi-Willig’s reimagined majority opinion, the theoretical shift causes Title
VII sexual harassment law to focus on the behavior of the accuser, not the behavior
46
of the victim. The impact of such a shift would have been immense, requiring
lower courts to scrutinize employer and worker behavior without resort to “victim
blaming.” As Ben-Asher points out, the transformation that Onwuachi-Willig made
to the law in her feminist judgment resonates with calls from the current #MeToo
47
movement and others to require affirmative consent for sexual relations. But the
law still lags behind, embracing a liberal model of feminism that, because it assumes
unconstrained choice and a balance of power between fully informed legal actors,
requires asking questions about why a woman did not report, leave her job, or resist.
In their response to the rewritten Loving v. Virginia opinion of Professor Teri
48
McMurtry-Chubb, former Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court Leah Ward

41 Mutcherson, supra note 36, at 151–67.
42 Elizabeth Kukura, Revisiting Roe to Advance Reproductive Justice for Childbearing
Women, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 20, 20, 23 (2018).
43 Id. at 20–22.
44 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Rewritten Opinion in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 303, 303–21.
45 Noa Ben-Asher, How Is Sex Harassment Discriminatory?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
ONLINE 25, 25–27 (2018).
46 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 44, at 315.
47 Ben-Asher, supra note 45, at 27.
48 Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 119, 119–36.
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Sears and her colleague Sasha Greenberg focus on the story of Mildred Jeter and
Richard Loving rather than the legal history that is the backbone of the rewritten
49
opinion. Though Sears and Greenberg agree that both the original U.S. Supreme
Court opinion and McMurtry-Chubb’s feminist judgment were correct in centering
their legal conclusions on the legacy of White supremacy, Sears and Greenberg place
their emphasis elsewhere. Their response highlights the family and individual lives
50
that were at risk because of the Virginia statute.
Sears and Greenberg also
emphasize developments that show society’s growing recognition of the artificiality
of racial barriers, which they find suggestive of the legal evolution that might be
51
brought about by cultural changes over time.
Political scientist Claire Wofford and Australian law professors Gabrielle
Appleby and Rosalind Dixon approach their reviews largely from a procedural
perspective. Both reviews tackle the concept of the book as a whole, as contrasted
with the reviews that focus on a single case. Wofford acknowledges the
groundbreaking nature of the book, but wonders whether the sole focus on judicial
52
decisionmaking is flawed. She points out that gender subordination comes into
play well before a decision is written, at least as early as the decision to file the
53
case. She cites a study that shows women are less likely to litigate than men and
54
so are underrepresented in judicial decisions. This result also suggests that the
cases we do see about gender discrimination are statistical outliers.
Similarly, Professors Appleby and Dixon praise the breadth of the cases
covered by the book, but see the book as primarily of interest to scholars and
academics. As a teaching tool, the book is, in their view, too diverse and unwieldy
55
to be easily digested by students.
They contrast the twenty-five cases in the
Feminist Judgments book with their own volume, The Critical Judgments Project:
56
57
Re-reading Monis v The Queen, in which several authors rewrite the same case.
Appleby and Dixon make a compelling argument that students can more readily
58
digest rewritten opinions if they are all of the same case. Appleby and Dixon also
suggest that diverse perspectives on one case have greater pedagogical value than a
volume of disparate rewritten opinions insofar as multiple rewritings of the same
case are more likely to demonstrate to students the wide variety in critical legal
59
thinking. They emphasize that their approach, which takes a critical legal stance
49 Leah Ward Sears & Sasha N. Greenberg, The Love in Loving: Overcoming Artificial
Racial Barriers, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 28, 29–30 (2018).
50 Id. at 30.
51 Id. at 30–31.
52 Claire B. Wofford, Looking to the Litigant: Reaction Essay to Feminist Judgments:
Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 32, 33
(2018).
53 Id. at 34.
54 Id. at 34–35.
55 Gabrielle Appleby & Rosalind Dixon, Extending the Critical Re-reading Project, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 37, 39 (2018).
56 THE CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT: RE-READING MONIS V THE QUEEN (Gabrielle
Appleby & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2016).
57 Appleby & Dixon, supra note 55, at 39.
58 Id. at 39–43.
59 Id. at 43.
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as opposed to a feminist one, is better suited to teaching students that legal reasoning
60
is an exercise in standpoint and perspective.
By contrast, Sarah Weddington, the attorney who argued Roe v. Wade before
the Supreme Court of the United States and an ongoing leader in the fight for
reproductive rights, sees the Feminist Judgments book as a clarion call to young
61
women, particularly law students, to fight for justice. Weddington, who argued
Roe at just twenty-six years old, is thought to be the youngest person to successfully
62
argue a Supreme Court case. In her review essay, she notes that activism takes
63
confidence and passion. Successful activists also need role models and mentors—
someone to tell a young person she can do it, and that she should do it. In
Weddington’s case, her clients encouraged her to fight to argue the case, even though
an older, more experienced man wanted to take the case from her when it got to the
64
Supreme Court. She encourages young people to use Feminist Judgments as a way
to gain confidence, to seek out causes that inspire them, and to find the mentors and
65
role models on whose shoulders they can stand.
Law professor Margaret Johnson’s review essay concludes the collection,
again by addressing the process of writing alternative judgments. She focuses on
66
the expanded role of narrative as integral to a more just judicial process. Johnson
observes that most of the rewritten opinions in the book alter or expand the narratives
67
of the original opinions. In this way, the opinions disrupt the perception that the
published opinion is the only story, and the only acceptable account of what
happened in the case. She, like Ben-Asher, refers to the #MeToo movement, but
Johnson’s emphasis is on #MeToo as a narrative movement that, like the rewritten
opinions, uses storytelling to undercut the power of the status quo. Johnson’s review
first embraces the concept of the book as a whole, and she then uses Ann McGinley’s
68
rewritten opinion of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. as an example
69
of how expanded narrative can dispute the law’s priorities and biases.
These review essays are thoughtful, thought provoking, and challenge all who
70
are engaged in Feminist Judgments projects around the globe to consider the
effectiveness of rewriting judicial opinions as a form of scholarship, a pedagogical
tool, or even an exercise in activism. A variety of questions common to all of the
60
61

Id. at 38–39.
Sarah Weddington, Feminist Judgments and the Future of Reproductive Justice, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 44, 45 (2018).
62 See, e.g., Sarah Weddington, Reflections on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Roe v. Wade,
62 ALB. L. REV. 811, 811 n.* (1999) (author’s note describing Ms. Weddington as the attorney
who “successfully argued the winning side of the landmark 1973 case of Roe v. Wade and is thought
to be the youngest person to win a case before the United States Supreme Court”).
63 Weddington, supra note 61, at 46.
64 Id. at 48.
65 Id. at 50.
66 Margaret E. Johnson, Feminist Judgments & #MeToo, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE
51, 51–54 (2018).
67 Id. at 52–54.
68 Ann C. McGinley, Rewritten Opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., in
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 414, 414–25.
69 Johnson, supra note 66, at 51–54.
70 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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global feminist judgments are ripe for further inquiry. First, we come back to the
question that started this Essay: Can feminist judging “fit” the “proper role of the
71
judicial system”? We believe that the opinions in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court answer that question with a resounding
72
“yes,” but we recognize that the question is still a matter of some controversy.
This broader question raises numerous corollary questions. If a judge
incorporates feminist perspectives into her judicial opinion, whether explicitly or
implicitly, is she more likely to be considered “biased” than a judge who
incorporates, say, a particular religious perspective into his judicial opinion? Why
73
does the feminist perspective indicate (to some) a built-in bias, but a Law and
74
Economics perspective does not? Given the possibility of being accused of bias,
75
how likely is it that a judge will reveal himself to be a feminist? Why does (or
should) such a revelation matter (or not), given that no judge can check his or her
personal life experience at the door to the courthouse? Finally, is feminism as an
analytic tool capacious enough to highlight bias in the law that is based on race,
gender, sex, sexuality, ethnicity, class, nationality, language, culture, ability,
71 Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 1, at 893.
72 See id. at 892. In 1990, Massachusetts gubernatorial candidate John Silber stated that he
would not appoint Gloria Steinem to be a judge because men would not get a fair hearing before
her. Fox Butterfield, Silber Taps Public’s Anger to Run a Strong Race in Massachusetts, N.Y.
TIMES (July 27, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/27/us/silber-taps-public-s-anger-to-runa-strong-race-in-massachusetts.html. And, more recently, in 2013, Republicans blocked the
judicial appointment of Nina Pillard to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, based in part on
her “militant feminism.” Dana Liebelson, The Republican Freakout Over This Feminist, ProChoice
Federal
Judicial
Nominee,
MOTHER
JONES
(Nov.
12,
2013),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/11/republicans-nina-pillard-dc-circuit-confirmation/.
73 See Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 1, at 896.
74 See, e.g., Mason Judicial Education Program, MASON L. & ECON. CTR.,
http://masonlec.org/divisions/mason-judicial-education-program/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018) (“For
over four decades, the LEC’s Judicial Education Program has helped train the nation’s judges and
justices in basic economics, accounting, statistics, regulatory analysis, and other related disciplines.
The Program offers intellectually rigorous, balanced, and timely education programs to the nation’s
judges and justices in the belief that the fundamental principles of a free and just society depend on
a knowledgable [sic] and well educated judiciary.”). If this reasoning applies to any perspectivebased analysis, then presumably judicial education in feminist theories and methods should be
equally welcome.
75 For two examples of judges who openly have embraced the feminist label, see Brenda
Hale, Foreword, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 5, at v. Lady
Hale became the first female president of the UK Supreme Court in 2017. See Haroon Siddique,
Brenda Hale Appointed as U.K. Supreme Court’s First Female President, GUARDIAN (July 21,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jul/21/brenda-hale-appointed-as-uk-supremecourt-first-female-president; see also Erika Rackley, What a Difference Difference Makes:
Gendered Harms and Judicial Diversity, in WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY 36 (Ulrike Shultz & Gisela
Shaw eds., 2012) (describing criticism of Australian judge who self-identified as a feminist at her
swearing-in ceremony); cf. Heather Roberts, Ceremony Matters: The Lasting Significance of the
Swearing-In Ceremony of Chief Justice Susan Kiefel, AUSTL. PUB. L. (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://auspublaw.org/2017/02/ceremony-matters/ (noting that Kiefel is the first woman to hold the
position of the Chief Justice of the (Australia) High Court, and that four speakers at the ceremony
referred to her Honour’s identity as a woman, but that Chief Justice Kiefel herself preferred to
“minimise allusions to her gender in her speech”).
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immigration status, and religion? As editors of the Feminist Judgments Series, we
76
believe that feminist perspectives are multiple and far from monolithic. In their
best iterations, feminisms should advocate for all historically disadvantaged people.
Our greatest hope is that Feminist Judgments will encourage students, lawyers,
judges, law professors, and members of the public to understand that the law’s future
trajectory is not etched in stone. We turn toward the future with a hope for a more
inclusive and just legal system.

76 See Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, supra note 12, at 3–4 (“[W]hen
we refer to feminist methods or feminist reasoning processes, we mean ‘methods’ and ‘reasoning
processes’ plural, all the while acknowledging that there is a rich and diverse body of scholarship
that has flourished under the over-arching label ‘feminist legal theory.’”). Although, as editors, we
left it to all contributors to define feminism for themselves, our own view is stated explicitly in the
introduction to Feminist Judgments. See id.

